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Abstract
Data owners with large volumes of data can outsource spatial databases by taking advantage of the cost-effective
cloud computing model with attractive on-demand features such as scalability and high computing power. Data
confidentiality in outsourced databases is a key requirement and therefore, untrusted third-party service providers in
the cloud should not be able to view or manipulate the data. This paper proposes DISC (Dynamic Index for Spatial
data on the Cloud), a secure retrieval scheme to answer range queries over encrypted databases at the Cloud Service
Provider. The dynamic spatial index is also able to support dynamic updates on the outsourced data at the cloud
server. To be able to support secure query processing and updates on the Cloud, spatial transformation is applied to
the data and the spatial index is encrypted using Order-Preserving Encryption. With transformation and cryptography
techniques, DISC achieves a balance between efficient query execution and data confidentiality in a cloud
environment. Additionally, a more secure scheme, DISC∗, is proposed to balance the trade-off between query results
returned and security provided. The security analysis section studies the various attacks handled by DISC. The
experimental study demonstrates that the proposed scheme achieves a lower communication cost in comparison to
existing cloud retrieval schemes.
Keywords: Data outsourcing, Spatial queries, Encryption, Dynamic updates
Introduction
With increase in spatial data, data owners require the
services of untrusted remote servers that can store huge
amount of data and allow fast access to outsourced data.
Cloud computing allows a third-party service provider to
manage the data and provide services directly to the end-
user. Cloud computing provides attractive features such as
scalability, cost-effectiveness and high-computing power.
Popular examples of cloud-based services include Google
Maps and Amazon EC2. In recent years, mobile devices
and navigational systems have become common and this
has created the need for location-based services (LBSs).
Mobile users issue queries from devices with limited stor-
age and computational resources. Spatial range queries
performed at the cloud server must be completed in
real-time and only relevant results should be returned to
the user.
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The cloud model consists of three entities, namely the
Data Owner (DO), Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and the
Trusted User (TU). The DO outsources the spatial data
and index for fast retrieval to the CSP, while the TU issues
encrypted queries to the CSP. The query is processed
directly on the encrypted data at the CSP without addi-
tional communication overhead between the TU and CSP.
The relevant results are returned in a secure format to the
TU, where decryption reveals the actual data points.
The fact that the data is controlled by an untrusted
third-party [1–4], raises security concerns about data con-
fidentiality. Data confidentiality requires that data is not
disclosed to untrusted servers, as they could release sen-
sitive information to competitors. Therefore, when out-
sourcing spatial databases in the cloud, the data should
not be visible to the service provider or adversaries. The
CSP provides services to multiple DOs and hence cannot
be trusted. Another prime concern is efficient query exe-
cution, which can be resolved by using a spatial indexing
structure for fast data access.
To achieve total confidentiality, the naïve solution is to
encrypt the whole dataset and send only the encrypted
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data to the cloud service provider. During the query phase,
the TU retrieves the entire encrypted data from the server,
decrypts it and searches for the required data points.
This makes ideal security achievable, but it is clearly not
practical in real-time applications as the resulting data
communication cost would be high, especially if only a
small portion of the data is queried. Furthermore, the high
processing power of the cloud environment would not be
utilized in this case.
This paper focuses on the development of an efficient
retrieval technique that can be executed on encrypted
data at the cloud service provider. Several special-
ized retrieval techniques have been proposed to answer
queries on encrypted data. Researchers have adopted
two different approaches to resolve this issue. The first
approach is to use spatial transformation techniques to
obfuscate the original data prior to sending it to the
CSP [5–8]. The other approach is to use cryptographic
techniques [9–12] to protect the confidentiality of the out-
sourced data. To provide a double layer of security, we
apply both transformation and encryption techniques on
the outsourced data.
In cryptographic approaches, some existing works use
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [13], which
can be used only to answer exact-match queries. While
others use the Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) tech-
nique [10]. OPE is a class of cryptographic techniques that
preserves the relative order of the encrypted objects, exe-
cuting range queries on the encrypted data directly at the
server without having to decrypt it. Although the security
of OPE falls short of the targeted industry standards, there
is a lot of interest by researchers in OPE as it allows com-
parisons directly on the encrypted data. Since this paper
supports queries on encrypted data at the CSP, we employ
the OPE technique for the index and the secure AES for
the spatial data points.
Security and query processing efficiency are important
when designing schemes applicable in a cloud environ-
ment. In this paper, the DISC (Dynamic Index for Spatial
data on the Cloud) scheme is proposed for answering spa-
tial range queries on encrypted databases at the CSP. In
DISC, a combination of transformation and encryption
is used to provide a fair balance between data confi-
dentiality and query execution. Another key advantage
of the proposed approach is that there is no need for
the DO to install an additional trusted front-end i.e. a
tamper-resistant device [14–16], between the user and
cloud service provider during query processing.
Briefly, the DISC retrieval scheme works as follows. The
DO transforms the spatial data points and indexes them.
The index is encrypted using the OPE technique for fast
data access at the CSP, while the spatial data points are
encrypted using the more secure AES. Next, the indexed
data is outsourced and encrypted queries are processed
entirely on the encrypted data at the CSP. Encrypted query
results are returned to the TU, where they are decrypted
using the key provided by the DO and then false posi-
tives are filtered to obtain the actual query results. With
DISC, it is also possible to perform updates dynamically
on the encrypted index at the CSP, where the DO issues
an encrypted update request to be partially carried out at
the CSP.
Contributions:
• A retrieval scheme is proposed to answer queries
over encrypted data at the CSP, ensuring
confidentiality of data outsourced by the DO.
• DISC provides efficient communication between the
TU and CSP (one round of communication).
• The proposed scheme supports dynamic updates
such as insert, delete and modify on the encrypted
data at the CSP.
• An enhanced and secure scheme, DISC∗, is proposed
as well to further obscure the data at the CSP.
• Furthermore, a comprehensive security analysis
against known attacks used in the literature is
provided.
• Simulation experiments were conducted on real data
to evaluate the performance of DISC and the
proposed scheme is compared to an existing
cryptographic transformation scheme in terms of
communication cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section surveys some existing work in this area.
“Problem statement” section briefly discusses the cloud
system model. Then, “DISC: a retrieval scheme” section
describes DISC used in our approach. “Indexing spatial
data” section discusses the indexing scheme in detail, and
“Answering spatial range queries at CSP” section presents
the spatial query phase, i.e., processing encrypted queries
at the service provider. “Dynamic updates at CSP” section
focuses on dynamic updates on DISC at the CSP. “Secure
scheme: DISC*” section proposes a secure and enhanced
DISC∗ scheme, which discusses the trade-offs between
efficiency and security. Next, “Security analysis” section
provides a security analysis on the transformation and
encryption technique incorporated in DISC. Lastly, exper-
iments are conducted on two real spatial datasets, and
the results with comparative and evaluative measures are
offered in “Experimental evaluation” section, followed by
conclusions in “Conclusions” section.
Related work
The issue of secure outsourcing of data has been
addressed in several recent papers. Hacigümüs et al.
[17] were the first to formally propose database services
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outsourcing to a third-party service provider. The typi-
cal model comprises of the data owner, service provider
and authorized users. The data owner outsources data
and query services to the untrusted service provider.
In Location-based services, trusted users issue queries
to the service provider. Despite the fact that the cloud
environment provides on-demand services along with
scalable storage and extensive computational power, it
poses data security and privacy challenges. The primary
goal is to secure data by encrypting it and allowing
queries on encrypted spatial data at the cloud service
provider. Batten et al. [18] propose a cloud storage
model, which comprises of cloud customers, cloud ser-
vice provider and cloud service operator. The customer
rents storage from the service provider, which owns
the cloud resources and maximizes storage resource uti-
lization between numerous customers, and the man-
agement of data storage is taken care of by the
service operator.
One of the existing work by Yiu et al. [5] proposed sev-
eral transformation as well as a cryptographic scheme
for outsourcing spatial databases. In data transformation
schemes, the data points are relocated in the space based
on an equation. In these schemes, the attacker can gain
knowledge about nearby points with limited background
information. The encryption based scheme inherits the
security of AES, where the DO stores the encrypted R∗-
tree index in the cloud. To process a query, the data owner
retrieve encrypted nodes of the R∗-tree level by level,
decrypts them and select intersected nodes. They are able
to hide the spatial data from the CSP, but cannot pro-
vide range query processing at the server. Thus, answering
queries requires multiple rounds of data communication
between the server and user.
Similarly, Kim et al. [19, 20] designed a transformation
scheme based on the Hilbert curve. The space is trans-
formed by clustering the data points and reducing the
dimensionality to 1 − D. The data is encrypted using
the conventional AES and stored at the server. To pro-
cess a range query, the entire encrypted file has to be
sent to the user to search for relevant records. The user
then requests for required data, hence requiring multiple
rounds of communication.
Both [5] and [19] result in a high communication cost
between the service provider and user owing to multi-
ple rounds of data exchange. To overcome this, Talha
et al. [21] present a dual transformation approach that
allows query processing on encrypted data at the server.
The original spatial data points coordinates are hidden
using the Hilbert space-filling curve and grouped in pack-
ets. The encrypted data is stored at the server. The user
sends encrypted spatial range queries and the results are
decrypted by the user. This lowers the communication
cost as it is limited to a single round.
However, the above-mentioned transformation-based
and cryptographic approaches are designed for static data
and therefore cannot handle dynamic updates. In the
event of any insertions, deletions or modifications to the
data, the dataset would have to be indexed and encrypted
again before outsourcing it to the CSP. Whereas, the
DISC scheme proposed in this work can handle dynamic
updates from the DO.
To support range queries over large datasets efficiently,
Damiani et al. [14] build a tree-index and store the nodes
of a B+ tree as encrypted blocks. To process a range selec-
tion, the user repeatedly retrieves a node, starting with the
root, and decrypts it to identify the child node to traverse
to. Upon reaching the target leaf node, he then follows the
sibling pointers in the leaf level.
On the other hand, Hore et al. [16] partition the data
into a set of buckets. The data owner builds indices for
buckets which are not hierarchically structured, so the
index search must be linear in the number of buckets.
Increasing the bucket size improves privacy but reduces
efficiency, since the indices must be locally stored, and
index searching is linear.
Data privacy and query integrity is assured by Ku et al.
[22] for outsourced databases. The points are encrypted
with a symmetric key and indexed based on the Hilbert
curve. A probabilistic approach is applied to a portion of
data encrypted with a different key to ensure reliability of
query results.
Recently, Wang et al. [9] proposed a framework that
provides both security and efficiency. They use an Rˆ-tree
index that is encrypted using Asymmetric Scalar-product
Preserving Encryption (ASPE) scheme. However, it does
not provide a privacy guarantee, nor does it provide con-
fidential query processing because it leaks information on
the ordering of the MBR of the leaf nodes and requires
result post-processing as it introduces false positives.
Wong et al. [23] propose a scheme for secure kNN
(k-Nearest Neighbors) queries on encrypted data. Dis-
tance comparisons between an encrypted query and data
points are achieved using ASPE, with query points and
data points being encrypted differently. Given two data
points and a query point, the cloud can determine which
data point is closer to the query point. Lu et al. [24] pro-
posed an outsourced range query scheme using predicate
encryption. This scheme provides provable security and
can achieve logarithmic-time search since it orders the
encrypted data points. However, it is not very practical as
it only supports 1-D data.
In contrast to the approachesmentioned above, Hu et al.
[3] propose that the DO outsources decryption keys to
the server, and provides users with encrypted data. In a
query process, a user first sends encrypted data and query
to the cloud, then the cloud uses the decryption key to
decrypt data and query, and return the result. The novelty
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of this paper is that they use homomorphic encryption to
ensure that the cloud cannot learn anything during the
query process. However, fully homomorphic encryption
[25] is highly impractical in practice.
To overcome the limitations of the existing schemes,
our approach is modeled to achieve a balance between
data confidentiality and efficient query processing i.e sin-
gle round of communication. To allow range queries over
encrypted numeric data, Agrawal et al. [10] propose the
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE), where a plaintext is
converted to ciphertext through order-preserving map-
ping functions This scheme is secure against ciphertext-
only attacks and fails when the data distribution or the
plaintext are known, as it is then straightforward to asso-
ciate an encrypted record with its plaintext counterpart.
Yiu et al. [26] utilize OPE in a metric-preserving trans-
formation, where each data point is assigned to its closest
pivot. The index reveals information about the space by
not hiding the number of points per pivot. The query is
evaluated with regards to the original space but the query
point is mapped to a pivot point. Furthermore, adaptive
chosen-plaintext attacks can reveal the secret key and help
identify dense areas in the space.
Problem statement
Systemmodel
In this paper, DISC is proposed, which is a Dynamic
encrypted Index for Spatial data on the Cloud. The DISC
cloud system model is shown in Fig. 1, and it comprises
of three distinct entities. Namely the Data Owner (DO),
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and the Trusted Users
(TU). Briefly, the process works as follows, DO outsources
spatial data to CSP which is queried by TUs. The database
is transformed, indexed and encrypted before it is stored
on the cloud. The keys are sent to the users by the DO. The
CSP processes encrypted range queries and modifies the
dynamic index with encrypted updates sent by the DO.
TUs issue encrypted range queries to the CSP and obtain
encrypted query results in a single round. Lastly, the TU
decrypts the results returned.
Notations
The DISC retrieval technique can be generalized to sev-
eral domains. Given a spatial dataset, D, at the DO with s
two-dimensional spatial data points, D = (d1, d2, . . . , ds),
represents physical locations in the space. The domain of
each dataset is normalized to the unit square [0, 1]2 in
2−D Euclidean space, E2. Table 1 lists the notations that
will be used throughout the paper.
Preliminaries
Hilbert Transformation: Space-filling curves are used
to map multidimensional data to one-dimensional data
where they pass through every partition in a given space
without any intersection with itself. The mapping has to
be distance-preserving such that points closer in space
are mapped onto nearby points on the curve. One of the
widely used curves is the Hilbert curve due to its supe-
rior clustering properties [27]. Spatial points are traversed
exactly once and indexed based on the order in which they
are visited by the curve.We begin by representing the area
of an N x N grid as a single cell. We iterate, and in the ith
iteration, i = 0, . . . , n − 1 (for N = 2n), we partition the
area of the N x N grid into 2i.2i blocks. Next, the points
are assigned Hilbert cell values based on the curve. The
grid is spanned according to the curve using the Hilbert
Space Key (HSK) [22]. The HSK = {x0, y0, θ , g}, where (x0,
y0) is the curve’s starting point, θ is the curve’s orientation
and g is the curve granularity. Based on the HSK, it is pos-
sible for two or more points to have the same cell value in
the curve.
Order-preserving encryption: It is a type of
homomorphic encryption scheme. Fully Homomorphic
Fig. 1 Proposed system model for spatial data outsourcing
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Table 1 List of Notations used
Notation Description
DO Data owner
CSP Cloud service provider
TU Trusted user
D 2D spatial data point set
FHSK Hilbert transformation function
H Hilbert cell value
KOPE Order-preserving encryption key
KAES Advanced encryption standard key
LHV Largest Hilbert value
nodeCapacity(nL) Node Capacity of a leaf node
QR Query Hilbert value set
R Query result set
Encryption [25] would be ideal as it allows query execu-
tion on encrypted data and is completely secure, however,
its high computation cost makes it prohibitive in practice.
Therefore, we employ the order-preserving encryption
(OPE) scheme proposed by Boldyreva et al. [28], which
allows range queries to be evaluated on the numeric data.
The order of plaintext data is preserved in the ciphertext
domain through a random mapping without revealing
the data itself. For an encryption key KOPE , if x < y, then
EKOPE (x) < EKOPE (y). OPE allows efficient access to the
encrypted data by maintaining a set of indexes for simple
comparisons, such as relational and logical operations
between values in a spatial range query request. For OPE
applied to integer values, the output set is bigger than the
input set meaning that no two values will have the same
encrypted value.
Hilbert R-tree: It is a hybrid structure based on the R-
tree and B+-tree that utilizes the Hilbert space-filling
curve. The nodes in the tree are sorted on the Hilbert
value of their rectangle centroid. A defining characteris-
tic of the Hilbert R-tree is that there exists an order of the
nodes at each tree level, respecting the Hilbert order of the
Minimum Bounding Rectangles (MBRs). Searching pro-
cedure is similar to that of R-tree. Each internal node entry
consists of the MBR that encloses all the objects in the
corresponding subtree, the largest Hilbert value (LHV) of
the subtree, and a pointer to the next level. Each leaf node
of the Hilbert R-tree stores the Hilbert coordinate of the
MBR of each data point stored and has a well-defined
set of sibling nodes. Thus, the Hilbert R-tree can keep
spatial data ordering according to Hilbert value when it
is updated dynamically. Dynamic Hilbert R-trees achieve
high degree of space utilization and good response time,
while other R-tree variants have no control over space
utilization. The Hilbert R-Tree allows around 28% sav-
ing in response time compared with existing structures.
Moreover, the R-tree index is non-deterministic as the
tree structure differs based on the sequence of insertions,
whereas the Hilbert R-tree does not suffer from this.
Systemmodel data flows
With DISC, it is possible to process user queries in a
secure and efficient manner. The data index is built and
encrypted at the DO and stored at the CSP, while the TU
issues encrypted spatial queries. There are four different
data flows in the model:
1. DO to CSP: Outsources the encrypted spatial index
to the CSP as well as the encrypted dynamic updates.
The Hilbert curve is used to transform the location of
spatial data points. Following the formal definition of
the Hilbert space-filling curve in [27], H2D with
granularity, g ≥ 1 is used for a two-dimensional
space. This implies that any point in the 2−D set, D,
is mapped to a 1−dimensional integer set
[ 0, . . . , 22g − 1] using the Hilbert transformation
function FHSK = f (d) based on the HSK (cf.
“Preliminaries” section). Next, the DO forms the
Hilbert R-tree. The encryption function EKOPE is
applied to the internal nodes in the index and EKAES
is used for the spatial points. Encrypted updates,
U = EKOPE (u), are sent individually to the CSP as
required.
2. DO to TU: The transformation key, HSK, and
encryption keys, KOPE and KAES, are sent by the DO.
Communication channel between the DO and TUs is
assumed to be secured under existing security
protocols such as SSL.
3. TU to CSP: TU converts the range query request to
a set of 1−D Hilbert indices, QR = (q1, . . . , qm),
using FHSK . This integer set is encrypted using EKOPE
and sent to the CSP to be executed over the
encrypted index.
4. CSP to TU: The encrypted query is processed
entirely at the CSP and the resulting data point set,
R = (EKAES (d1), . . . ,EKAES (dr)), encrypted using
AES, is returned to the TU where it is decrypted
using EKAES and filtered to remove false positives.
DISC: a retrieval scheme
The data owner stores data on remote servers that pro-
vide querying services to trusted users. Data confiden-
tiality in an outsourcing retrieval scheme is key as data
is managed by an untrusted party i.e. CSP. A common
mechanism to ensure secure data outsourcing is encryp-
tion, so that the CSP can learn as little information about
the plain data as possible. In this work, DISC is proposed
to process encrypted queries directly on encrypted data,
Kamel et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications  (2017) 6:5 Page 6 of 16
in order to keep the data and query results confidential
from adversaries. It is required to have a balance between
data confidentiality and query execution. A spatial index-
ing structure is built to provide fast data access and in
turn, efficient query processing.
Indexing spatial data
Spatial index is a data structure used to improve the effi-
ciency of spatial data operations on data objects. Common
spatial index methods include the R-tree and its vari-
ants. DISC, a Dynamic encrypted Index for Spatial data
on the Cloud, uses the dynamic Hilbert R-tree [29] with
regards to the Hilbert transformation used to discretize
the data points. The index structure is then encrypted
using theOrder-Preserving Encryption scheme (OPE [28],
while the actual data is encrypted separately with a secure
symmetric encryption method, AES.
The indexing scheme used by the DO is illustrated in
Figs. 2 and 3. The index construction process at the DO is
initiated with static 2−D spatial data points in the space.
Next, each spatial point in the space is assigned a Hilbert
cell value in the grid. In the example in Fig. 2, the space
is partitioned into 64 cells by applying a Hilbert curve of
granularity 3 with starting point (0, 0).
Next, the Hilbert R-tree index is constructed bottom-up
based on the ascending Hilbert cell values. The DO then
encrypts the Hilbert R-tree internal nodes and Hilbert
values in leaf nodes using OPE, while the data points in
the leaf nodes are encrypted using AES before being out-
sourced to the CSP, since it is not a trusted entity. This
protects the sensitive data from being leaked by the CSP
(i.e. to third-party vendors). The CSP does not have the
ability to decrypt the encrypted data without the secret
keys. The DO sends the transformation and encryption
keys only to TUs.
The encrypted index and data points at the CSP are
shown in Fig. 3. The leaf and non-leaf nodes are encrypted
using OPE [enclosed in a red dashed box] to support range
queries and dynamic updates, while the data points in the
leaf nodes [enclosed in the blue solid box] are encrypted
individually using the secure and traditional encryption
scheme, AES [13]. The parent-children relationships (i.e.
pointers) in the index are not encrypted in order to allow
efficient query search. Additionally, the DO sends theOPE
key and the AES key to the TUs so that they can send
encrypted queries to the CSP and decrypt the returned
query results.
Algorithm 1 lists the pseudo-code for the dynamic index
construction process. In the first loop (Lines 1–4), each
spatial data point di in D is normalized to [ 0, 1]2 and
then its Hilbert cell value is computed using the Hilbert
transformation function, FHSK , based on theHilbert Space
Key. In Line 5, the resulting Hilbert cell values for all
data points are stored in C and sorted before building
the Hilbert R-tree Index (Line 6). Lines 7–12: all the
nodes in the tree are encrypted. If it is an internal node,
MBR and LHVs are encrypted using the OPE scheme to
allow for comparisons on the encrypted data. While, data
points in the leaf nodes are encrypted using AES. Lastly
Algorithm 1 Encrypted Index Construction (by DO)
Input:
Spatial Data Points, D = (d1, . . . , ds)
Encryption Keys, KOPE and KAES
1: for all d in D do
2: Normalize di
3: Compute Hilbert value, c of di using FHSK and add
to C
4: end for
5: I = BuildHilbertR-Tree()
6: for all n in I do
7: Encrypt MBR and LHV using KOPE
8: if ni is a leaf node then
9: Encrypt data points in ni using KAES
10: end if
11: end for
12: Send Encrypted Index, IE , to CSP
Fig. 2 Spatial data points at the DO mapped to Hilbert cells
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Fig. 3 Index construction process based on transformation
(Line 13), the index is outsourced to the Cloud Service
Provider.
Answering spatial range queries at CSP
The key requirement for query processing at the cloud
server is fast response time. The encryption scheme in
DISC encrypts nodes without modifying the index struc-
ture, hence faster than linear search is possible. The DISC
retrieval scheme deals with 2−D spatial range queries
due to their popularity. In spatial range query algorithms,
the index search propagates downwards starting from the
root node, considering whether node entries overlap with
cells in the query region.
When a query request is initiated by the TU, the rect-
angular region of the range query, (QW ([(cx0, cy0), (cx1,
cy1)])), is converted to a set of 1-D Hilbert cell values
[30] by the TU, which includes cells that may partially or
completely overlap with the query region. Since some of
these cells only partially overlap with the query region, the
set of cells might retrieve irrelevant data points (i.e. false
positives) in the query response. Having false positives
in the results is a reasonable trade-off for security, given
that the ordering information and data points are securely
encrypted in DISC. The Hilbert cells in the query set are
then encrypted by the TU using the OPE key. The CSP
is responsible for processing the encrypted query request
over the spatial index.
Figure 4 shows the spatial range query procedure.
Queries are formulated in terms of their OPE encrypted
Hilbert values and AES encrypted data points corre-
sponding to encrypted Hilbert values are returned. The
CSP searches the index created by DISC, performing com-
parison tests level-by-level, and proceeding to a node’s
children if and only if the node’s LHV is greater than
the query value. The CSP thereby obtains all leaves con-
tained in the query region, and then returns data points
in leaf nodes to the TU with Hilbert values corresponding
to the queried values. We assume that the granularity for
the Hilbert curve transformation is high enough, such
that each data point is associated with a unique Hilbert
value. The CSP cannot query the data points themselves
as comparisons cannot be made on data encrypted using
AES.
The Hilbert R-tree index improves the search perfor-
mance as it uses Hilbert cell values to impose a total order
on the entries. Algorithm 2 shows the complete spatial
range query procedure. Lines 1 − 6 and Line 18 list the
process at the TU, while Lines 7 − 17 highlight the query
processing procedure at the CSP. First, the rectangular
query region, QW ([(cx0, cy0), (cx1, cy1)]), is converted
Algorithm 2 Spatial Query Processing on Encrypted Data
(CSP)
Input:
Query Window QW, [(cx0, cy0), (cx1, cy1)]
Encryption Keys, KOPE and KAES
1: Q = Hilbert cells contained in QW  At TU
2: for all q ∈ Q do
3: QR = QR ∪ KOPE(q)
4: end for
5: Send encrypted QR to CSP
6: for all n nodes in Index do  At CSP
7: if (ni is a leaf node then
8: Check for intersection between QR and all
Hilbert Values in ni
9: Add corresponding data points to R
10: else if LHV(ni) is greater than QRi then
11: Search recursively in the subtree under ni
12: end if
13: end for
14: Return encrypted spatial data points, R, to TU
15: TU decrypts R using KAES to obtain actual data
objects
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Fig. 4 Query processing at the cloud service provider on encrypted data sent by trusted users
into a set of ascending Hilbert cell values (Line 2) and
stored as QR at the user end. Next, in Lines 3 − 5, the
TU encrypts QR using the encryption function KOPE .
The encrypted QR is sent to the CSP as QR along with
the encrypted query windowQW. In Lines 9−16, starting
from the root, the search descends the tree structure and
examines all nodes, n, that have Hilbert values less than
the queried values,QR. If ni is at the leaf level, eachHilbert
value in the leaf node is checked against query Hilbert val-
ues in QR. The encrypted data points of matched values
are returned as the query response, R, to the user (Line
17). In Line 18, the TU then decrypts the retrieved data
points using the KAES key and generates the actual query
response.
Dynamic updates at CSP
Besides processing spatial range queries efficiently at the
cloud service provider, DISC allows dynamic updates on
encrypted data. DISC takes advantage of the total order-
ing based on Hilbert transformed values in order to sup-
port updates. The proposed scheme is capable of updating
an OPE encrypted index at the CSP without revealing
the underlying index structure. Dynamic data includes
three update operations on the encrypted index: insert,
delete and modify. In order to update a spatial data point
in DISC, the data owner first needs to issue an update
request. Based on the request, the CSP has to locate (i.e.
query) which leaf nodes of the index are directly affected.
Lastly, all updates applicable to the parent nodes are
propagated upwards till the root.
Insert: The new spatial data point to be inserted is sent in
an encrypted format by the DO to the CSP. The data point
is encryped using AES and the corresponding Hilbert
value (H) of the MBR centroid is computed and encrypted
using OPE, so that comparison operations can be made.
For insertion, the Hilbert R-tree index performs binary
search on the total ordering of Hilbert values and these
are used as the key value to find the insertion location in
the encrypted index, based on simple value comparisons.
Starting from the root node, at each level the node with
the minimum LHV greater than H of all its sibling nodes
is chosen. When a leaf node, nL, is reached, insertion can
be done. If the node capacity of nL has not exceeded the
node capacity, nodeCapacitymax, the AES encrypted data
point is inserted in nL along with the H value. If the leaf
node, nL, is full, overflow has to be handled by by split-
ting the leaf node into two and moving half of the ordered
entries to a new node. Lastly, the index has to be adjusted
such that the LHV values of the parent nodes reflect the
newly inserted value. The algorithm at the functional level
is listed in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Insert Encrypted Data in DISC
Input:
Encrypted Data Point, KAES(d)  Sent by DO
Encrypted Hilbert Value, KOPE(H)
1: nL = FindLeafNode(KOPE(H))  At the CSP
2: if nL < nodeCapacitymax then





Delete: To delete a data point, the Hilbert value of the
data point to be deleted is sent in an encrypted for-
mat by the DO to the CSP. The Hilbert value (H) is
encrypted using OPE, so that comparison operations can
be conducted on the index. In the Hilbert R-tree dele-
tion process, the entry with the Hilbert key value (i.e.
leaf node, nL, with H) is removed without visiting multi-
ple paths in the index. A delete update on the leaf node
may cause nL to go under the minimum node capacity,
nodeCapacitymin. In the event of an underflow, sibling
nodes can be merged together. A functional-level algo-
rithm is listed in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 Delete Encrypted Data from DISC
Input:
Encrypted Hilbert Value, KOPE(H)  Sent by DO
1: nL = FindLeafNode(KOPE(H))  At the CSP
2: Delete(KOPE(H)) in nL




Modify: In order to modify a data point over encrypted
DISC, the CSP conducts an insert and a delete operation
on the index at the server. Thus, the DO has to send the
data point to be deleted and the new data point to be
inserted. For the modify operation, the CSP needs to first
locate where the point to be deleted lies in the index, then
delete it. It is not feasible to insert the data point in the
same location as the deleted point as their positions in
the indexed tree may differ. Lastly, updates are propagated
upwards till the root node of the tree.
Secure scheme: DISC*
The data owner creates encrypted range queries, and
sends them to the CSP, where they are processed over the
encrypted index. The CSP performs the search starting
from the root and proceeding to a node’s children if the
query value is less than the largest Hilbert value. In DISC,
the lowest level of the index comprises of leaf nodes which
stores the data points in a particular Hilbert cell. Thus, the
CSP returns the encrypted data points matching the query
Hilbert values (in OPE) to the TU. The CSP is unable to
query the spatial points themselves as they are securely
encrypted using AES. DISC is a retrieval scheme which
is capable of returning the exact set of encrypted points.
Given that the LHVs in the leaf nodes are encrypted
using OPE, the ordering information of points within the
Hilbert transformation can leak over time. Given a series
of spatial queries over a period of time, the attacker can
rebuild the order of data points in the transformed space
based on the intersection of query results. The DISC index
can be fine-tuned to accomodate the trade-off between
security and false positives in the query result. Therefore,
we propose DISC∗, a more secure retrieval scheme that
protects the ordering of spatial points in the leaf nodes
of the index. As displayed in the index in Fig. 5, the leaf
node level along with the data points is encrypted in AES
[enclosed in blue solid box]. This may induce a number of
false positives in the query results returned and thus fil-
tering will have to be performed at the user-end. This is a
reasonable trade-off, given the additional layer of security
at the CSP.
Secure spatial range queries at CSP
The query processing is still done entirely at the CSP and
follows the same procedure as listed in Algorithm 2 (cf.
“Answering spatial range queries at CSP” section). The
query processing time is reduced in DISC∗, as there is
no need to compare Hilbert values in the leaf (Line 8).
The search space is restricted to the non-leaf nodes in the
index and this helps locate the leaf node whose Hilbert
value is closest to the query value. In Line 9, instead
of returning relevant data points, the whole leaf node is
returned. This will induce some additional points that are
not part of the query result, and can be filtered by the TU
after decryption in a post-processing step.
Secure dynamic updates
In DISC, it is possible to update the index at the CSP given
the update operation and encrypted data from the DO.
But in DISC∗, given that the entire leaf node is encrypted
using AES and not just the data points, it is not possi-
ble to update directly at the CSP. Thus, secure updates
require a single round of communication between the DO
and CSP. The complete procedure is illustrated in Fig. 6.
First, The update request is initiated by the DO. The
DO sends the OPE encrypted Hilbert value correspond-
ing to the update operation. Second, the CSP searches the
Fig. 5 Spatial data index construction by the data owner
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Fig. 6 DISC∗ scheme procedure for dynamic updates between data owner and cloud service provider
encrypted index and locates the leaf node corresponding
to the Hilbert value. Third, the leaf node is sent from the
CSP to the DO. Fourth, in order to perform the update, the
DO has to decrypt the AES encrypted node and perform
the respective update. Next, The DO encrypts the node
using AES and sends it to the CSP along with the LHV of
the node encrypted using OPE. Lastly, the CSP replaces
the updated node in the index and propogates updates
upwards till the root based on the updated Hilbert value.
Even though partial update is performed at the DO, it is
clear that hiding ordering information in DISC∗ enhances
data confidentiality.
Security analysis
The key requirements of a secure data outsourcing
scheme demand that: 1) data confidentiality at the server
and 2) queries are efficiently processed by the CSP and
results are returned to the user without any alteration.
As mentioned previously, the TUs are trusted by the DO
and hence have been provided with both the HSK, as
well as the encryption keys. We focus on the curious
intruder model [31] to analyze the attacks posed to DISC,
which requires Hilbert transformation of the data points
before encryption. Moreover, the Hilbert cell values of
data points are encrypted using OPE, while the actual
data points are encrypted using AES. AES provides the
standard security guarantee and hence, is not suscepti-
ble to common attacks triggered by obtaining background
knowledge of a subset of the data.
Hilbert transformation
It is intuitive that if an attacker is aware of the space trans-
formation technique used (i.e. Hilbert curve in DISC), as
well as a subset of the original spatial data points along
with their transformed Hilbert values, the attacker can
determine the key of the transformation technique i.e.
Hilbert Space Key (HSK). But, the study by [7] suggests
that it is infeasible for a malicious adversary to infer the
exact HSK being used as there exist an exponential num-
ber of possible HSKs, as shown in the analysis of the attack
below.
Brute-force attack: In the event of a brute-force attack,
the attacker will have 2b ∗ 2b ∗ 2b elements for x0, y0 and
θ in the entire search space. The number of possibilities
for the curve granularity g as G. To accurately find the
curve’s starting point, it should lie on the intersection of
two edges. Using b bits for each x0 and y0, the attacker
can generate 2b values on each axis and this will require
an exhaustive search over the grid. Likewise, for the curve
orientation, the entire continuous 360° space should be
discretized to generate 2b values. Since G  2b, the com-
plexity of the brute-force attack to find the transformation
key is O(23b), where b is the number of bits used to repre-
sent each parameter in the HSK. Choosing a large enough
value for b, will make the Hilbert mapping irreversible.
Given that b is chosen to be 32 bits, the complexity of find-
ing the HSK parameters would be O(23∗32) for different
possibilities of the curve granularity.
Order-preserving encryption
In OPE, the ciphertext is in the form of numeric data.
Since OPE schemes can support comparison operations
on the ciphertext, it is infeasible to achieve ideal security
for OPE. Boldyreva et al. [28] were the first to provide a
complete security analysis on OPE. The higher the secu-
rity provided by the encryption scheme, the lower its
efficiency and support of operations. Therefore, to achieve
a low communication cost and a single round of data
exchange between the CSP and TU, we settle on a weaker
OPE scheme that leaks as little information of plaintext as
possible. Also, with traditional encryption methods, it is
not possible for untrusted CSP to process user queries on
the encrypted data.
Ciphertext-only attack: This is the most common attack
for encryption techniques. The one-wayness property of
encryption was proven to hold, where the adversary is
unable to invert the encryption without the knowledge of
the key. But the adversary may be able to gain informa-
tion about the order of encrypted values revealed by the
OPE scheme and predict the plaintext values (i.e. if (p1, c1)
and (p2, c2) are known for p1 < p2 and no other known
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plaintext-ciphertext pairs occur between these two). If the
adversary knows a certain number of plaintext-ciphertext
pairs, the scheme splits the plaintext and ciphertext spaces
into subspaces. On each subspace, the analysis under each
one-wayness definition reduces to that of the random
order-preserving function domain and range of the sub-
space. The ciphertext space must be at least twice the size
of the plaintext space. Thus, in the OPE scheme adapted
by the DISC/DISC∗ approach, the OPE parameters are
chosen in such a way that subspaces are unlikely to violate
this condition.
Discussion: The AES encrypted spatial points are stored
along with their OPE Hilbert values in the index at the
CSP. The security of the scheme can be exposed if the
attacker can gather limited background knowledge about
the data distribution without the encryption keys. How-
ever, Hilbert R-trees do not expose the complete ordering
of spatial data points. In some cases, even if it is possible
to gather some information regarding the ordering of the
leaf nodes from queries over a period of time, the attacker
cannot infer the actual location of the spatial point (cf.
Lemma 1).
Lemma 1 Considering the worst case, assuming that an
attacker can decrypt the ordering of a subset of Hilbert cells
in the grid, the attacker can estimate the Hilbert value of
the actual spatial data point as one of the O(232) different
possibilities of the Hilbert curve granularity, g.
Proof Given the total number of spatial points in D, and
the granularity of the Hilbert curve, g, the average num-
ber of points assigned to each Hilbert cell is computed as
follows:
cellavgPoints = size(D)22∗g (1)
Therefore, selecting a small value for the Hilbert curve
granularity, g (i.e. g << size(D)), results in multiple
spatial points being assigned to the same Hilbert cell. This
increases the security provided by DISC and DISC∗, but
increases the number of false positives returned in the
query result.
Experimental evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed approaches,
DISC and secure DISC∗, several experiments were con-
ducted. We compare and analyze the difference in com-
munication cost based on the query size and node capacity
of the index. DISC and DISC∗ are empirically compared
with the Cryptographic Transformation (CRT) method
proposed by Yiu et al. [5]. Experiments were performed
on an Intel Core i7-3770 CPU @ 3.40 GHz with 16 GB
of RAM running the 64-bit Ubuntu operating system and
implemented in C++.
Experiment on all datasets are conducted with varying
query sizes ranging from 5 to 20%, where each spatial
range query is a randomly distributed region in the nor-
malized domain space. Each MBR in the non-leaf and leaf
nodes is represented by 4 coordinates. Each LHV in the
nodes is the Hilbert value and is represented by 4 bytes
(an integer), and each spatial data point consists of x and
y coordinates in double precision (16 bytes). The results
shown in the experiments below are averaged over 100
runs for 4 varying query sizes.
Spatial datasets
Our experiments are performed on four real-world spatial
datasets obtained from [32]: (1) City of Oldenburg (OL)
Road Network comprising of 6104 points, (2) City of San
Joaquin County Road Network (TG) having 18,263 points,
(3) North East USA (NE) consisting of 123,593 points,
which represent the real postal addresses and (4) Road
Network of North America (NA) with 175,813 points is
approximately 2800 KB. The domain of each dataset is
normalized to the unit square [0, 1]2 and two of these
datasets are shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7 Two real-world spatial datasets: road networks. (1) Oldenburg (OL), (2) North East USA (NE)
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Table 2 Index construction time (s) for various node capacities
Index construction time (s)
Node capacity OL TG NE NA
10 0.26 1.51 4.31 8.14
20 0.29 2.36 5.50 9.72
30 0.35 3.91 7.36 11.19
Index construction time
In DISC, the Data Owner builds an index over the spatial
dataset which is based on the Hilbert R-tree. The dataset
is transformed using the Hilbert curve. An empty Hilbert
value means that there is no data point associated with it
and these empty values are discarded during the initializa-
tion process. The index construction time is averaged over
100 runs. The DISC construction time is proportional to
the number of spatial points in the dataset and Table 2
shows time taken to build the index for all 4 datasets.
DISC is constructed initially at the DO and outsourced
to the CSP where it is used to answer queries and handle
dynamic updates from DO.
Effect of node capacity
The value of node capacity is the maximum number of
data points per node, which dictates how the index is con-
structed. An optimal value of the capacity reduces the
amount of pages searched at the server as well as the
amount of data sent from the CSP to the TU. Figure 8
shows the effect of the node size on the query processing
time on the DISC index at the cloud server for a small and
big dataset, with node capacity ranging from 10 to 30. It
can be seen that the query time and node capacity have an
inversely proportional relationship, the query search time
decreases when the node capacity is increased. This is due
to the fact that Hilbert R-tree index will have a greater
height (i.e. more levels) when a smaller node capacity
is used. Other datasets and query sizes follow a similar
trend, as does DISC∗.
Query processing time on the cloud
The search performance of the DISC index is faster-than-
linear with regard to the number of spatial data points.
Figure 9 shows the time taken to process range queries
on an encrypted index at the Cloud Service Provider.
The experiments have been conducted on all datasets and
results of OL and NE are displayed due to space limi-
tations. The other two datasets display a similar trend.
The range query size in this experiement is 20% and the
average query time is measured in ms over 100 runs for
varying node capacities of the index in DISC. The x-axis
shows the node capacity, while the y-axis shows the aver-
age query processing overhead in milliseconds. When the
node capacity is small, the average query time is more,
but as the node capacity increases, the query time drops
and this is appropriate for a CSP as they have adequate
computing power. With a smaller node capacity, more
levels in the tree have to be navigated through. Com-
paring DISC with the more secure DISC∗ reveals that
DISC∗ has a faster processing time as the leaf nodes are
encrypted in AES and its values cannot be compared
against Hilbert values. The most time-consuming task in
DISC is to sequentially check overlapped leaf node for
queried Hilbert values. As the size of the query increases,
the time taken to process the query also increases.
False positive rate
Both DISC and DISC∗ induce a number of false posi-
tives in the query result. Given that false positives increase
security, a significant false positive rate is not a major
concern in a secure outsourcing scheme such as DISC.
Hence it is expected that the more secure scheme DISC∗
has a higher false positive rate than DISC. As we have
noted previously, data owners can tune the spatial index
for different tradeoffs between security, query efficiency
and false positives. Figure 10 shows the average false pos-
itive rate for 100 queries over the larger data set NE, while
other datasets follow a similar trend. We compare both
schemes and show the impact of different query sizes
Fig. 8 Query processing time (ms) based on various node capacities (Datasets: OL & NE)
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Fig. 9 Query processing time (ms) at the CSP (Datasets: OL & NE)
and various node capacities on the false positive rate. For
larger query sizes, the false positive rate increases as more
data points are returned. For larger node capacities, the
false positive rate is usually less than 50% and the increase
in the average false positive rate becomes steady.
End-to-end time for a query between the DO and CSP
Figure 11 illustrates the average end-to-end user time of
the approach evaluating spatial range queries (10%) on the
OL and NE datasets for both schemes. The TU makes
use of an Android mobile phone (HTC) in this experi-
mental evaluation. The transfer bandwidth of the network
considered here is 1 Gbps [33]. The round-trip network
delay time is the time taken for one round-trip between
the TU and the CSP, which is 125 ms [34]. It is not
shown in the graph as our approach requires only one
round between the CSP and TU and is hence fixed for
all query sizes. Other network delays and faulty packet
transmission issues due to network errors is not taken
into account. The end-to-end user time comprises of four
components:
• Query Encryption Time (TU): Is the amount of time
taken to encrypt the query Hilbert cell set using
Order-Preserving Encryption.
• Query Request Time (TU): Is the amount of time
taken to transform the range query window to the
Hilbert cell set and send it to the CSP over the
network.
• Query Response Time (CSP): Is the amount of time
taken to process the spatial query over DISC and
generate the result set to send back to the user over
the network.
• Result Decryption Time (TU): Is the amount of time
taken filter the false positives and decrypt the query
result set using the AES key. The decryption time
taken for 1 KB of data is 0.015 ms using the AES
scheme at the user-end [35].
Figure 12 shows the network transer time in millisec-
onds over a 1 Gbps connection. The query request from
the TU to the CSP as well as the query response from the
CSP to the TU over the network is shown for different
query sizes for the NE dataset. The end-to-end time relies
on the size of the query as well as the indexed dataset.
It is visible that the bulk of the time is taken to return
the query result from the CSP to the TU. The CSP has
scalable computational power and this does not affect
the performance of the location-based services provided.
The main idea is to have minimal processing done at the
Fig. 10 Average false positive rate (%) for query sizes and node capacity
Kamel et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications  (2017) 6:5 Page 14 of 16
Fig. 11 User to cloud service provider: end-to-end spatial query time (ms)
user-end as they have limited resources. Forming the
query takes a minute amount of time and the efficient
encryption scheme (AES) allows fast decryption of query
results. Since the OL dataset is small in size, the decryp-
tion time is almost negligible and hence not shown in the
graph. The secure DISC∗ scheme has a higher time at the
CSP as a larger result set is returned.
Query communication cost between user and CSP
In the experiment shown in Fig. 13, 100 random spa-
tial range queries of varying sizes were generated and
the amount of data (i.e. average communication cost in
bytes) exchanged between the CSP and TU is measured.
The communication cost includes: 1) Query Request: TU
transforms the query region into a set of Hilbert cell
values and transmits the encrypted set of values to the
Fig. 12 Between TU and CSP: network transfer time (ms) for query
request and response
server, 2) Query Response: the CSP searches DISC for
corresponding leaf nodes and returns the encrypted data
points as the result. The query sizes ranging from 5 to 20%
are used in the experiments.
In DISC, the leaf nodes are searched sequentially for
query Hilbert values so that the exact points can be
returned. Therefore, varying the node capacity of DISC
would result in identical communication cost. Whereas,
DISC∗ has a higher communication cost in comparison
to DISC as the entire leaf nodes are returned as part of
the query result. Hence, increasing the node size in DISC∗
would increase the communication cost as well. It is clear
that the average communication cost increases linearly as
the query size increases due to the increase in number
of points returned. The result is decrypted at the user-
end using the AES key. The OL and NE dataset results
are displayed here, while the rest of the datasets follow a
similar trend.
The proposed retrieval scheme is compared with the
CRT technique (the R∗-tree index structure is built and
encrypted using AES), and shown in Fig. 13. This is
an appropriate comparison, since the R∗-tree achieves
the same query time complexity as these schemes. It
is demonstrated that our method is at least twice as
fast as we require only one round-trip between the CSP
and TU, which minimizes the communication overhead.
It can be seen in experiments that the communication
cost increases as the size of the spatial dataset increases.
Moreover, for query sizes greater than 15%, there is a
sharp increase in the communication cost of CRT due
to the amount of messages exchanged between the user
and server, which is dominated by the depth of the R∗-
tree utilized. This is due to the fact that in CRT, the
query is processed at both the user and server side, result-
ing in multiple rounds of communication. Moreover, CRT
returns entire leaf nodes to the user, while using DISC, the
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Fig. 13 DISC and DISC∗ vs. CRT: Effect on communication cost (KB) with different query sizes (Datasets: OL & NE)
server is able to retrieve the relevant data points in the
leaf nodes based on the query Hilbert values. Even DISC∗
is able to achieve highly efficient queries, while hiding the
ordering of data points within each leaf node.
Dynamic updates at the CSP
Dynamic updates are initiated by the DO and transmit-
ted to the CSP. The CSP executes the updates on the
encrypted index based on the Hilbert value of the given
update. The DISC scheme allows dynamic updates on
encrypted data by preserving the order of data (using
OPE) in the encrypted leaf and non-leaf nodes, but pre-
serving the parent-child relationships by not encrypting
the pointers. To the best of our knowledge, none of the
prior works provide the update characteristic in their
retrieval schemes. The main advantages of the Hilbert R-
tree is its ability to handle dynamic updates. The CRT [5]
technique does not allow updates and only handles static
data, as the tree split/merge procedure cannot be applied
on AES encrypted data in the R∗-tree.
Experiments were performed on DISC for all dynamic
update operations and the only communication cost
entailed is the request sent from the DO to the CSP,
where the update is handled. For instance, the inser-
tion of a new object and overflow handling is peformed
using the Hilbert value of the new data point. Whereas
in DISC∗, updates cannot be performed entirely at the
CSP as the leaf nodes are encrypted using AES which
does not allow comparison operations. In Fig. 14, we show
the communication cost for three types of insert oper-
ations. First, the DO sends the update request which is
just an encrypted Hilbert value. For the sake of simplicity,
the simple insert update is explained in detail in “Secure
dynamic updates” section. The CSP responds by return-
ing the affected leaf node and the DO returns the updated
encrypted nodes. In the case of overflow and sibling
insert, multiple rounds of communication are required
as neighboring leaf nodes are also sent to the DO. Fur-
ther details on the more complex insert operations can
be found in [29]. The other update operations, delete
and modify, follow a similar exchange of data as insert
and excluded for brevity. After analysis, the most costly
operation was modify, followed by delete and lastly insert.
Conclusions
Data outsourcing has attracted much attention recently
due to the emergence of cloud computing. Cloud com-
puting virtualizes storage and computing resources at
the server and provides data to trusted users. However,
securing the outsourced data in the untrusted cloud server
has security concerns. In this work, we are trying to strike
a balance between data confidentiality and efficient query
processing at the cloud service provider. We propose the
DISC retrieval scheme, which has a dynamic encrypted
index for spatial data at the CSP. The index is encrypted
using the OPE technique, as it allows comparison oper-
ations on encrypted data at the server. Moreover, DISC
allows dynamic updates at the CSP. An enhanced and
Fig. 14 Communication cost (bytes) between DO and CSP for an
INSERT update
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secure version, DISC∗, is proposed as well. Several attack
models are defined and it is shown that our scheme pro-
vides proven security against well-known attacks. Lastly,
experiments were conducted and it is demonstrated that
the DISC retrieval scheme improves the range query
performance and is superior to existing cryptographic
approaches. In conclusion, the retrieval scheme proposed
in this paper enables users to retrieve spatial range query
responses efficiently and allows dynamic updates on the
encrypted index.
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